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EDUCATORS' AUTHORITY AND STUDENTS'
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS ON THE WAY
TO USING THE INFORMATION HIGHWAY:
CYBERSPACE AND SCHOOLS
PHILIP TK. DANIEL*
PA TRICK D. PA UKEN**
I. INTRODUCTION
As more public school educators focus on access to electronic
media, they are increasingly required to address concerns about
information sent and received by students. Unlike traditional sources
of communication such as newspapers, books, and current events
publications, the electronic media has few controls, no continuous
process of verification, and little in the way of accountability. The
perceived need for some order and responsibility for the safety and
welfare of students has led a growing number of school
administrators to draft, or consider drafting "acceptable use policies"
to monitor and control the use of school computers.1 While courts
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traditionally have granted great deference to the authority of school
personnel in managing the educational environment, 2 programs and
policies controlling student communication may face a number of
legal challenges.
This Article will present a brief history of the information
superhighway, and a description of the organization and operation of
cyberspace and the Internet, especially as it relates to schools. The
authors will discuss the Communications Decency Act (CDA or "the
Act"), 3 the arguments on both sides of the legal challenge to the Act,
and the recent Supreme Court decision in Reno v. A CLU4 declaring
the Act unconstitutional. This part of the discussion will reference
First and Fifth Amendment case law influencing the Supreme Court's
decision. The authors will also discuss schools' authority to
promulgate acceptable use policies, paying particular attention to
First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment school-based
decisions.
While the Supreme Court has ruled the CDA unconstitutional, a
discussion of Reno is vitally important to a broad discussion of the
legality of schools' acceptable use policies. First, the constitutional
rights of students may be more limited in schools, and the interests of
school officials themselves in the provision of a safe and orderly
educational atmosphere may be heightened.6 Second, should a
challenge be filed against an acceptable use policy in the future, the
arguments presented by both parties in Reno may be instructive to
schools, parents, students, and lawyers in asserting claims based on
the rich body of constitutional case law governing public schools and
their decision-makers.
2. See generally DAVID J. SPERRY Er AL., EDUCATION LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS:
A COMPENDIUM (2d ed. 1998).
3. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 132-35, § 502 (available at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-
(h) (West Supp. 1997)).
4. 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
5. See id. at 2350-51.
6. See generally Vernonia Sch. Dist 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995); Hazelwood Sch.
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969); see also SPERRY ET AL., supra note 2.
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II. CYBERSPACE AND THE INTERNET
A. A Brief History of the Internet
The Internet was developed in the 1960s as a Department of
Defense experiment to link defense-related computers.7 The goal was
to create a network that could still function even if part of it were
destroyed during a war.8 The next decade witnessed the creation of
non-militar7 computer networks, linking researchers at universities
worldwide. Shortly thereafter, an information network available to
the public evolved with the first newsgroups.' 0 The information
superhighway is now an international phenomenon," linking
people-young and old, professional and amateur, at home and at
school or work-in a variety of ways, from electronic mail and
newsgroups to "chat rooms" and the World Wide Web. With the
advent of the World Wide Web, the 1990s became the decade of
information retrieval. Those with computers have the ability to
combine words, pictures, and sounds on "web pages." Many of these
web pages are created by students or school personnel and are
available to anyone with the appropriate technology. One hundred
and fifty nations now visit and participate in maintaining this
electronic library. 2 Users can search for, find, and download text
documents, pictures, moving images, and sound recordings covering
virtually every communicable topic. According to the Supreme Court
in Reno v. ACLU, by 1999, an estimated 200 million users will drive
on this information "highway."'
3
Many of these "drivers" enter the highway from school, and have
been given licenses by the federal government via recent legislation.
7. See Appellant's Brief, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 96-51 1), available
in 1997 WL 32931, at *3; Life on the Internet, <http://www2.pbs.orglinternetlhistory>.
8. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2334.
9. See id.
10. See id.; Life on the Internet, supra note 7.
11. Only about 60/o of the Internet's host computers are located in the United States. See
Appellees Brief, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 96-511), available in 1997 WL
74378, at *17.
12. See Life on the Internet, supra note 7.
13. See 117 S. Ct. at2334.
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For example, in Goals 2000: Educate America Act 14 and the
Improving America's Schools Act of 1994,15 the federal legislature
included provisions that directly and indirectly encourage and
authorize the creation of funds for bringing technology into schools.1
6
Goals 2000 funds may be used to integrate technology and education,
as well as help satisfy student achievement and professional
development goals.17 Similarly, but more explicitly, Subchapter III of
the Improving America's Schools Act authorizes federal grants to
states and school districts to create or expand technology-related
programs and curricula in all subjects, including math, science,
history, reading, and the arts.18
B. Organization and Operation of Cyberspace and the Internet
Generally, cyberspace is a decentralized, global electronic
environment where the user can view and manipulate text, pictures,
and sound recordings as though they had the physical attributes of
shape, color, and motion. Cyberspace links people, institutions,
corporations, and governments around the world. These links are
made possible by a network of linked computers-actually a network
of smaller networks-called the Internet. As its name implies, the
Internet is not a centralized source of information. In fact, it is not a
tangible entity at all. No single institution operates it or controls it. 19
The decentralized nature of cyberspace and the Internet, of course,
has both positive and negative implications. Perhaps the most
positive aspect of cyberspace is that the information available on the
Internet is equally accessible to everyone. Every piece of data posted
on the Internet, however obscure, is available to any properly
14. 20 U.S.C. §§ 5801-6084 (1994).
15. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6301-8962 (1994).
16. Seeid.
17. See KIRK WINTERS, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., AN INVITATION TO YOUR COMMUNITY:
BUItDING COMMUNITY PARTNERSHIPS FOR LEARNING (1995).
18. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6979 (1994); see also U.S. Department of Education,
Challenge Grants Support Local Technology Partnerships, Community Update No.42
(December, 1996), at 1.
19. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. at 2334-35; see also 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-49 (E.D.
Pa. 1996). While the Supreme Court reviewed and summarized the facts presented by the
district court, the district court opinion contains lengthy, developed findings of fact.
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connected user who "surfs the Net" long enough and creatively
enough to find it. In other words, there are no isolated points on the
Internet; all points are somehow connected to one another. While the
path between points A and B may not be a straight line, experienced
"surfers" can get from A to B with minimal degrees of separation.
It takes no stretch of the imagination to discover that the most
positive feature of the Internet-its accessibility-may also be its
most negative. Point A, for example, could be a child at home or at
school, and point B could be sexually explicit material that would be
considered indecent or patently offensive. On the one hand, it is this
negative aspect, the hundreds of thousands of questionable Web sites,
and the alleged potential damage to children that led lawmakers to
draft and pass the CDA.20 On the other hand, it is, in large respect,
the positive aspect of cyberspace that led other lawmakers to argue
against passing the Act,21 hundreds of thousands of Internet users to
criticize the Act, and the ACLU and the American Libraries
Association to lead the constitutional challenge against the Act.22
1. Communication over the Internet
The CDA was designed to outlaw the communication and display
to children of obscene, indecent, or patently offensive information.
23
These communications and displays can reach great numbers of the
American population over the Internet in any one of several ways.
Each of these communication options is as easily used to access
20. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S718 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Exon); 141
CONG. REC. S8345 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden); 141 CONG. REC.
S8088-89 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon); see also Appellant's Brief, Reno,
1997 WL 32931, at *5-9.
21. Senator Patrick Leahy, who stood in opposition to the Act, argued that its language
would chill a wide range of expression. As an example, he pointed out that great works of
literature by world famous authors are currently on the Interet. See 142 CONG. REC. S694
(daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996). These works, he suggested, could offend the contemporary standard of
conservative groups in the country and thereby violate the CDA, He argued that other areas also
could be censored, including issues of gender, safe sex practices, birth control, and discussions
about AIDS. See 141 CONG. REC. S18,098 (daily ed. De-. 6, 1995).
22. As discussed at length below, the plaintiffs in Reno argued that the CDA violated the
First Amendment fiee speech rights and the Fifth Amendment due process rights of computer
users. See generally Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
23. See 142 CONG. REC. S718 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Exon).
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information, often by children, as it is used by adults to send or
display information, often to children. For this reason, the district
court in ACLU v. Reno, and the parties on both sides of the dispute,
spent much time discussing the forms of communication available on
the Internet.24
The first and simplest form of communication in cyberspace is
electronic mail, or "e-mail." Electronic mail is similar to mail
delivered by the Postal Service. Each person with an e-mail account
has an "address" through which letters and documents may be sent or
received.25 In properly equipped schools, each student, teacher, and
administrator may have an e-mail account that is accessible at school
or from home. Naturally, e-mail enhances students' ability to share
ideas and answer questions about school work.
Even more geared to the work of schools is one-to-many
messaging, also called "mail exploders. 26 A teacher, for example,
may require students to subscribe to an e-mailing list in order to
receive feedback, assignments, and deadline dates. Through one-to-
many messaging, subscribers receive messages and documents from
headquartering institutions or organizations. It is also possible for a
subscriber to send a message to many other subscribers
simultaneously.
27
Similar to one-to-many messaging, newsgroups are targeted to
specific groups of Internet users, often based on particular topics.
28
However, users do not formally subscribe to newsgroups.
Newsgroups work as suspended or protracted, rather than real time,
"conversations" on certain topics among interested users. An
individual user "posts" a message or document on a newsgroup
server, and other interested users check the server periodically to
receive them. Schools may use newsgroups in several ways. For
example, a school may create its own site and encourage students to
communicate with other students on various topics, regardless of
24. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 830-38 (E.D. Pa. 1996), afJ'd, 117 S. Ct. 2329
(1997).
25. See id. at 834.
26. See L
27. See id. One form of one-to-many messaging is a LISTSERV, by which Internet users
may subscribe to lists of their choice based on the topics discussed. See id.
28. See id. at 834-35.
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whether the communicating students share any classes. Teachers may
also encourage students to check the Internet periodically for certain
newsgroups that are relevant to school courses or projects.
Yet another type of Internet communication, real-time
communication, allows computer operators to engage in immediate
dialogue with other current operators in a manner similar to long-
distance telephone conversations. 29 Much of this communication
occurs in "chat rooms. 30 While there are many positive, educational
reasons to communicate with people over the Internet, the variety of
potentially harmful real-time communications was, of course, what
most concerned many of the CDA detractors.
2. The World Wide Web
The World Wide Web contains the world's largest, most advanced
single body of knowledge and information.3' The World Wide Web,
in effect, is an on-line library for teachers and students. Many schools
have Web pages32 and Web sites in order to advertise the school and
promote school activities. Some of these Web pages provide links to
other sites that allow searchers to look for information on other Web
pages regarding individual school groups. Schools' Web pages may
also permit users to broaden searches by linking them to Web pages
describing the entire school district. Through the World Wide Web,
members of the school community-students, teachers,
administrators, parents, alumni, and other citizens-are kept
informed about school progress and activities.
33
29. See id. at 835.
30. Generally, a "chat room" is a virtual room where a chat session-real-time
communication between two users via computer-takes place. See PC Webopaedla (last
modified May 12, 1998) <http://www.pcwebopedia.com/chatroom.htm>.
31. See generally An Overview of the World Wide Web (last modified Mar. 11, 1998)
<http://www.pcweloopedia.com/World_WideWeb.htm>.
32. Web pages are also referred to as "home pages." See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2335.
33. See Brian Monahan and Sue Tomko, How Schools Can Create Their Own Web Pages,
EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP, Nov. 1996, at 37-38.
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III. SCHOOL-BASED CONTROL OVER THE INTERNET: ACCEPTABLE
USE POLICIES
Acceptable use policies are sets of rules, regulations, rights, and
responsibilities that govern the use of the Internet and the World
Wide Web in schools. 34 They inform students and teachers, and
sometimes parents, about electronic media and how interactive
computer facilities should and should not be used. These policies
spell out the benefits of proper use of the Internet and the pitfalls and
punishments of improper use. Acceptable use policies typically are
drafted by school board members, administrators, and teachers, but
students, parents, and community members are often consulted in the
drafting process. While school personnel have the inherent authority
to create acceptable use policies, the policy drafters must be careful
to outline the rules and regulations precisely enough to withstand
constitutional challenges.
35
Typical acceptable use policies separate "Dos" from "Don'ts,"
rights from responsibilities, and work priorities from game-playing.
In addition, some acceptable use policies may distinguish rules
regulating document creation and distribution from those regulating
document retrieval. Examples of what responsible student Internet
users are permitted to do include research for assigned classroom
projects and communication by electronic mail to other users both in
and outside the school. Schools are also very careful to require that
students take necessary security measures: schools encourage
students to change passwords frequently and advise students not to
store confidential information on a school-sponsored computer
account.36
Along with a list of what students are permitted to do, acceptable
use policies typically contain a non-exhaustive list of forbidden
34. Most schools place acceptable use policies on the Internet as a separate Web site or as
part of the school's home page. Some Web sites provide examples and analyses of several
acceptable use policies. See, e.g., Fausett, supra note 1.
35. Acceptable use policies face constitutional challenges similar to those lodged against
the CDA, including vagueness and overbreadth under the Fourteenth Amendment. Obscenity,
free expression, viewpoint discrimination, and related curriculum issues are also often issues
under the First Amendment. See infra Part V1.
36. See generally Fauset, supra note 1.
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activities. Generally, students may not engage in illegal activity over
the Internet; use, communicate, or send impolite, abusive, vulgar,
lewd, indecent, or obscene language or pictures; use e-mail to hinder
the ability of others to work, or to harass or intimidate another
person; or use the computer system for personal financial gain or
profit.37 In addition, acceptable use policies may forbid students from
sending or receiving copyrighted material without the permission of
the relevant authors or creators, and from copying commercial
software in violation of copyright laws.38 Many schools combine
acceptable use policies with filtering and blocking software, such as
Cyber Patrol, Net Nanny, and Surf Watch, installed on classroom
computers or on the district server.3 9
The lists of forbidden activities found in many acceptable use
policies are similar in several ways to the disputed provisions of the
Communications Decency Act. Both restrict the speech and
expression of Internet surfers, covering material received and
material sent. In addition, both were drafted with the safety and
protection of children in mind, and both legitimately aim to
encourage use of the Internet by children.40  Because of these
similarities, the Supreme Court's declaration of the
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., Nation's Schools Developing Internet Guidelines for Students, WEST'S
LEGAL NEWS, Aug. 27, 1996, available in 1996 WL 480010; Michelle V. Rafter, Students Told
to Abide by Rules ofthe Superhighway Guidelines, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1996, at DI, available
in 1996 WL 11638423.
39. See Andrew Trotter, Decent Exposure: Should Schools Limit Access to the Internet?,
AM. SCH. BOARD J., Sept. 1996, AI2, A14.
40. When Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act, it recognized that
interactive computer services represented "an extraordinary advance in the availability of
educational and informational resources ... [and] a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad avenues of intellectual
activity." 47 U.S.C. § 230(aX1), (3) (Supp. 1996). At the same time, proponents of the CDA
sought to ensure that the "brave new world" of these computer services would not be "hostile to
the innocence of... children," and noted that children are now the "computer experts" in this
country's families. 141 CONG. REc. S8332-34 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Coats); see also Appellant's Brief, Reno, 1997 WL 32931, at *6-7. The appellants in Reno
feared that with potentially harmful sites in cyberspace-and without the CDA-many families
and schools would be less likely to provide Internet access to children. See id. at *30. The
proponents of the CDA, therefore, fought for the Internet as a family-friendly resource. See id.
at *6-7. Similarly, schools that promulgate acceptable use policies often include education on
computer and Internet use and may require classes and exams before granting students Internet
use. See generally Fauset, supra note 1.
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unconstitutionality of the Communications Decency Act could
influence the drafting and enforcement of acceptable use policies.
One commentator has proposed a rather negative similarity between
acceptable use policies and the CDA: "Almost without exception,
[acceptable use policies] read like field-trip permission slips on
steroids-pumped up policies that, like the Communications Decency
Act itself, try to cover all contingencies and inevitably fail. Perhaps
the most insidious problem with these policies is the false sense of
security they promote."41
The critical difference between the Communications Decency Act
and acceptable use policies is that the users who would have been
subject to penalties under the CDA (had the Act passed constitutional
muster) are largely adults, while the target audience of acceptable use
policies is children.42 Because the constitutional law applicable to
adults and children differs in many fundamental respects, a
discussion of the law influencing Reno v. ACLU and of the law
currently applicable in school situations is necessary, as both of these
discussions impact the future of acceptable use policies and Internet
activity by school students.
IV. STATUTORY CONTROL OVER THE INTERNET: THE
COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT
A. Legislative History and Congressional Findings
The Communications Decency Act was a small but controversial
part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. 43  The full
41. David A. Splitt, Decency vs. Free Speech: There is No Substitute for Supervision, AM.
SCH. BOARD J., Sept. 1996, at A17.
42. See generally Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, 132-
35 (available at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a)-h) (West Supp. 1997)). Note, though, that an exhaustive
reading of the CDA reveals that minors are not explicitly exempted from prosecution under the
CDA.
43. Pub. L. No. 104-104 §§ 502-52, 110 Stat. 56, 133-42 (1996). Although the Supreme
Court declared the Communications Decency Act unconstitutional in Reno v. ACLU, a
discussion of the decision and the arguments on both sides is important in the context of public
schools and acceptable use policies. First, in comparison to the control that a general
government actor has over its citizens, public schools may exercise greater control over the
activities and expression of their students. Therefore, unconstitutional provisions in the CDA do
not dictate that acceptable use policies in public schools suffer the same fate. Second, if the
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol54/iss1/9
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Telecommunications Act contains language concerning the provision
of advanced universal telecommunications services, at affordable
rates, to schools and libraries.44 The Act also authorizes the allocation
of funds to the National Education Technology Funding Corporation,
a new private non-profit corporation that, in part, encourages states to
create and upgrade Internet access in schools. 45 In addition, the Act
authorizes the Federal Communications Commission to offer
guidelines for the identification and rating of television and video
programming that contains sexual or violent material.46 Under the
Act, the FCC requires televisions to be equipped with a blocking
service, the V-chip, permitting consumers to block the display of all
programs with a common rating.47
As contentious as some of the other provisions of the
Telecommunications Act may be, the most debated and most
controversial provisions were those set forth in Title V, the
Communications Decency Act. Enacted by Congress in 1996, the
CDA was intended to protect minors from accessing indecent or
patently offensive material and imposed criminal sanctions on
knowing creators and transmitters of such material.48
Congress noted the necessity of its re-write of the
Communications Act of 1934 by recognizing the overwhelming
recent developments in computer technology. In its findings,
Congress stated that the Internet "represent[s] an extraordinary
advance in the availability of educational and informational
resources," as well as "a forum for a true diversity of political
discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and myriad
avenues of intellectual activity. '49 In floor debates over the Act,
language in a certain acceptable use policy is similar to the language in the CDA, the school
that promulgated the policy could expect challenges and arguments similar to the ones
presented by the plaintiffs in Reno.
44. See § 101, 110 Stat. at 73-75 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
45. See § 708, 110 Stat. at 157-60.
46. See§551, 110Statat 140.
47. See § 551(dXl)(B), 110 Stat. at 141-42. This Article is limited to a discussion of the
Communications Decency Act. For a discussion of how many other provisions of the
Telecommunications Act may impact students in grade school and higher education, see
Kenneth D. Salomon, et al., Implications of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 for Schools,
Colleges, and Universities, 109 ED. L. REP. 1051 (1996).
48. See § 501-561, 110 Stat. at 133-43.
49. Section 509(l),(3), 110 Stat. at 137-38 (available in 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(a)(1), (3)
1998]
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Senator James Exon noted that computers are "wonderful ... for
arranging, storing, and making it relatively easy for anyone to call up
information or pictures on any subject they want. That is part of the
beauty of the Internet system." 50 However, Exon also argued that the
same technology that permits productive educational uses also allows
sexually explicit materials to be "only a few click-click-clicks away
from any child.' Senator Joseph Biden echoed these concerns:
"some of the information traveling over the Internet is tasteless,
offensive, and downright spine-tingling.
52
Educators were similarly nervous. They feared that with the
introduction of the Internet in schools, students would become
"preoccupied with pornography, participate in hate groups, form
relationships with pedophiles, and gather recipes for bombs."
53
Therefore, and perhaps against the broad authorizations of Goals
2000 and the Improving America's Schools Act, Congress found that
a legislative response was necessary to ensure that the Internet would
remain a family-friendly resource. 54
B. Major Provisions of the CDA
The three most disputed provisions of the CDA-and the subjects
of the case that came before the United States Supreme Court-
consisted of the "transmission" provision, the "specific person"
provision, and the "display" provision. The provisions, in pertinent
parts, are as follows:
The Transmission Provision:
[Any person] (1) in interstate or foreign communications
[who,] ... (B) by means of a telecommunications device,
knowingly ... makes, creates, or solicits and initiates the
transmission of any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication which is obscene or indecent,
(West Supp. 1997)); see also Appellant's Brief, supra note 7, at *5.
50. 141 CONG. REC. S8089 (daily ed. June 9, 1995) (statement of Sen. Exon).
51. 141 CONG. REC. S8088.
52. 141 CONG. REC. S8345 (daily ed. June 14, 1995) (statement of Sen. Biden).
53. Trotter, supra note 39, at A12.
54. See 142 CONG. RFC. S718 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (remarks of Sen. Exon); Brief for
the Appellants, at *7, ACLU(No. 96-511).
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knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18
years of a e ... shall be [criminally] fined ... or
imprisoned."
The Specific Person Provision:
[It is a crime to use an] interactive computer service to send to
a specific person or persons under 18 years of age ... any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive, as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless




[It is a crime to use an] interactive computer service to display
in a manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any
comment, request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other
communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms
patently offensive, as measured by community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs, regardless of whether
the user of such service placed the call or initiated the
communication.
57
Each of these provisions could have been applied easily in school
settings. For example, if a computer operator outside of a school
creates and initiates the transmission of indecent material to a person
he or she knows to be a school student under the age of eighteen, then
the computer operator could have been liable under the Act. This
material could be a part of a Web site created by the operator.
Similarly, if this communication were part of an on-line dialogue or
electronic mail message sent directly to a student, then the computer
55. Communications Decency Act, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502(2)(1)(B), 110 Stat. 133-34
(1996) (available at 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(aX1)(B) (West Supp. 1997)) (emphasis added).
56. Section 502(dXl), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (d)(1)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
57. Section 502(dXl), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223 (d)(1)(B). According to the Appellants in Reno
v. ACLU, Congress intended for the terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" to be used
interchangeably. See Appellant's Brief, Reno, 1997 WL 32931, at *10.
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operator could have been liable under the specific person provision.
The broadest and, therefore, the most contentious of the
provisions, was the display provision. This language could have
subjected schools to liability for permitting students to read or view
indecent or patently offensive material on the Internet. Under the
display provision, a school official could have been liable even if the
communication or display to students was indirect, unintentional, or
unknowing.
To combat the breadth of these provisions and to limit the number
of computer users subjected to federal criminal prosecution, Congress
also enacted several statutory defenses, many of which would have
been important in school settings.58 First, a defendant prosecuted
under the CDA would not have been liable "solely for providing
access or connection to or from a facility, system, or network not
under that person's control."59 In a school, it is likely that all
computer facilities and equipment available for student use are under
the control of the school.60 However, the outside computers or
networks to which school computers may be connected are not under
school control. This defense could have protected schools and school
officials who permitted students to access the Internet while at
school. This defense may also have worked as an incentive, or at least
as security to school officials who contemplated the installation of
Internet access for schools.
Second, a defendant accused under the CDA may have contended
that the statutory violation was committed by an employee or agent
acting outside the scope of the agent's employment.61 For example, a
teacher may have improperly made available to students a list of
questionable Web site addresses. If one of these sites contained
material prohibited by the CDA, then the teacher could have been
liable. However, the school district, as the teacher's employer, could
have escaped liability if the teacher's actions were not within the
scope of employment. Exceptions to this defense included: (1) the
employer's authorization or ratification of the employee's conduct,
58. See Section 502(e), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e) (West Supp. 1997).
59. Section 502(e), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(1) (West Supp. 1997).
60. An exception may be a portable computer owned by a student, but used at school.
61. See Section 502(e), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(e)(4) (West Supp. (1997).
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and (2) the employer's reckless disregard of such conduct.62
The CDA's third statutory defense the "good faith" defense,
relieved defendants of liability if they had taken: (1) "reasonable,
effective, and appropriate actions ... to restrict or prevent access by
minors" to prohibited communications; or (2) if they had "restricted
access to such communications by requiring the use of a verified
credit card, debit account, adult access code, or adult personal
identification number., 63 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court
declared the CDA unconstitutional, the first part of this defense
remains helpful to schools that have implemented and enforced
acceptable use policies. As noted above, public schools may exercise
control over the activities and expression of their students that the
federal government may not exercise over its adult citizens.
Therefore, provisions similar to those in the unconstitutional CDA
may be constitutional when contained in a school's acceptable use
policy. In light of this distinction, and in the absence of litigation
involving constitutional challenges against acceptable use policies,
school officials may argue that as long as these policies are
reasonable, effective, and protective of the health, safety, and welfare
of school children, they remain constitutional.
V. CHALLENGES TO STATUTORY CONTROL: RENO V. ACLU
A. The District Court Opinion
On the day President Clinton signed the Communications
Decency Act into law, the American Civil Liberties Union and
several other affected parties filed suit in the federal district court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, challenging the constitutionality
of the CDA. The American Library Association, and several on-line
service providers, such as America Online and Prodigy, filed a
similar action. The two suits were consolidated, and the challenges
were addressed by a three-judge district court.
64
62. See id.
63. Section 502(c), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(eX5) (West Supp. 1997).
64. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997).
Section 561 of the CDA provided for the three-judge review of the Act in any civil action
challenging the CDA's constitutionality. See § 561, 110 Stat. 142-143. Section 561 also
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The district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary
injunction. In three separate opinions, the judges concluded that the
plaintiffs had demonstrated sufficient likelihood of success in future
litigation under the Act, that the potential harm to the plaintiffs
without the injunction outweighed the harm to the defendants with
the injunction, and that injunctive relief was in the public interest.
65
In its opinions, the court held that the contested provisions of the
Communications Decency Act were prima facie unconstitutional,
based on First Amendment freedom of speech claims and Fifth
Amendment vagueness charges.
66
B. The Supreme Court Decision
Pursuant to the CDA's special review provisions, the Government
appealed the District Court decision directly to the United States
Supreme Court.67 In a 7-2 decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's ruling and held the Communications Decency Act
unconstitutional.68 The Court's ruling is notable for at least two
reasons. First, the Court based its entire decision on a First
Amendment analysis. Second, much time was spent discussing the
technology currently available on the Internet and recommended
guidelines for the future regulation of this technology.
1. The Majority Opinion
The government, in its defense of the CDA, relied on several
principles developed in earlier Supreme Court cases involving697
indecent communication. 9 Relying first on Ginsberg v. New York,70
the government asserted that there is no First Amendment Right to
provided for direct appellate review by the Supreme Court. See id.; see also 47 U.S.C.A. § 223
(Vest Supp. 1997).
65. See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 849.
66. See id.
67. See§ 561, 110 Stat. 142-43.
68. See Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997). Note, however, that all nine Justices
agreed that portions of the CDA were unconstitutional. See id. Justice O'Connor, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissented in part with respect to some applications of the "indecency
transmission" and "specific person" provisions. See id. at 2351-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
69. Seeid.at2341.
70. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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distribute indecent material to children.7' In Ginsberg, the Supreme
Court upheld a criminal statute that punished the sale to minors of
sexually explicit magazines considered "'patently offensive to
prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with respect
to what is suitable material for minors.' ' 72 The Supreme Court in
Reno rejected this argument, noting that the CDA was much broader
than the constitutional statute at issue in Ginsberg.73 First, the Court
noted that parents under Ginsberg were not subject to prosecution for
purchasing adult-oriented magazines for minor children, but that,
under the CDA, they would have been guilty by simply providing
access to similar material in cyberspace. 74 Second, the Court stated
that the Ginsberg statute applied only to commercial transactions,
while the CDA applied to any provider.75 Third, the Court noted that
the language in the CDA was not as well-defined as the language in
the Ginsberg statute.76 Finally, the Court stated that the Ginsberg
statute applied to minors under seventeen, while the CDA applied to
those under eighteen, broadening the scope of the statute even
further.
77
The government also relied on FCC v. Pacifica,78 asserting that
when the dissemination of indecent material to adults poses a
substantial risk that children will be exposed to the material, the
government may channel the indecent communications so as to
minimize the risk of children being exposed, despite the fact that such
a restriction is content-based.79 In Pacifica, the Court upheld an FCC
71. See Appellant's Brief, Reno, 1997 WL 32931, at *19-20.
72. 390 U.S. at 633 (quoting N.Y. PENAL LAW § 484-h (1965)). Applying Ginsberg, the
government argued that the "transmission" and "specific person" provisions of the CDA did not
prohibit communication among adults. The government argued that the provisions only
prohibited communication of indecent material to users known to be under eighteen. See id. The
government essentially argued, then, that these provisions were no different from the statute in
Ginsberg. See id.
73. See 117 S. Ct. at2341.
74. See id. In such situations, parents may have been guilty under the display provision.
See § 502(dXl), 47 U.S.C.A. § 223d(1)(B) (West Supp. 1997).
75. Seell7S.Ct.at2341.
76. See id. The Court noted that the statute in Ginsberg required the restricted material to
be "utterly without redeeming social importance for minors." Reno at * 11 (citation omitted).
77. See id.
78. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
79. See Appellant's Brief, Reno, 1997 WL 32931, at *20-21.
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decision that a radio station could be sanctioned for an afternoon
broadcast of a comedy routine containing several sexually explicit
words.80 The Pacifica Court stated that "broadcast media have
established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the
airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the
privacy of the home .... 81
In rejecting the government's Pacifica-based argument, the Court
first noted the availability of and accessibility to potentially harmful
materials: "Though such material is widely available, users seldom
encounter such content accidentally .... A child requires some
sophistication and some ability to read to retrieve material and
thereby to use the Internet unattended. 8 2 The Court then held that the
FCC regulation at issue in Pacifica was aimed at a specific radio
broadcast and not at a loosely defined set of potentially harmful
communications.8 3 In addition, violation of the FCC regulation did
not subject the offending party to a criminal sanction. 4 Finally, the
Court held that radio has historically been the most regulated medium
of communication and, therefore, has received the most limited First
Amendment protection.85 With this assertion, the Court stated that
"[n]either before nor after the enactment of the CDA have the vast
democratic fora of the Internet been subject to the type of
government supervision and regulation that has attended the
80. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748-51.
81. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. The government argued in Reno that Pacifica was directly
applicable. See Appellant's Brief, Reno, 1997 WL 32931, at *31-32. While the danger of
"inadvertent exposure" to indecent material is higher on the radio than it is on the Internet, the
government urged the Court to look at other factors such as the seriousness, pervasiveness, and
volume of material, as well as the ineffectiveness of parental and teacher supervision. See id.
82. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336. Some critics may disagree, however, and assert that it is not
difficult to encounter material that the CDA aimed to keep from children. For example, a net
search with the keywords "little women" or "snow white" could yield a very wide variety of
material-some expected and perfectly appropriate for children and some unexpected and under
the umbrella of the CDA. Vocabulary well within the range of children may result in "hits" on
the Net that involve pornographic material. Furthermore, these critics may argue that the Court
has underestimated both the reading ability and the computer operation skills of young net
surfers.





broadcast industry.' ' 6 According to the Court, factors present in radio
broadcasting 7 and telephone communication t -- like a history of
governmental regulation, scarcity of available frequencies at the
industry's inception, and an overall invasive nature-are not present
in cyberspace.
The next major cases the government relied on were City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.90 and Young v. American Mini
Theatres.9' The decisions in these cases permit the government to
adopt reasonable zoning schemes to address the secondary effects of
sexually explicit communications. 92 In both Renton and Young, the
Supreme Court upheld zoning restrictions that prohibited adult
theatres within a certain distance from residential dwellings,
churches, parks, or schools. 93 Restrictions like these are constitutional
when they are geared at secondary effects like crime, loss of retail
trade, reduction in property value, and reduction in quality of life.
94
According to the government in Reno, the display provision of the
CDA operated as a zoning provision, channeling indecent material to
other "neighborhoods" in cyberspace where only adults may
communicate.95 However, the Court in Reno made relatively easy
work of this argument, holding that the CDA was a content-based
86. Id. at 2343.
87. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC,
395 U.S. 367 (1969).
88. See, e.g., Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
89. See 117 S. Ct. at 2343. This final argument by the Court is not entirely convincing. It
is obviously difficult to compare the regulatory histories cf two media when one of them-the
Intemet-has an extremely limited history. Clearly, regulation of radio broadcasts had to start
somewhere as well. With statements like the Court made here, it is a wonder any new
regulation in any industry is ever upheld. It is difficult to understand how the Court could argue
that the Internet, cyberspace, and the World Wide Web are not pervasive-or invasive-today.
See id. It is, however, convincing that the radio regulation in Pac/ica and the dial-a-pom
regulation in Sable Communications dealt with different media and did not effect complete bans
on protected speech among adults. See Sable Communications, 492 U.S. 115 (1989). In Sable,
the Court struck down a prohibition against the dissemination of indecent telephone messages
for commercial purposes (dial-a-pom). See id. Those regulations, according to the Reno Court,
were narrower than the prohibitions in the CDA. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
90. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
91. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
92. See Appellant's Brief, Reno, 1997 WL 32931, at *21-22.
93. See 475 U.S. at 54; 427 U.S. at 70.
94. See Renton, 475 U.S. at 49 (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34).
95. See Appellant's Brief, Reno, 1997 WL 32931, at *32-33.
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regulation aimed at theprimary effects of the speech.96 Consequently,
the Court stated that a time, place, and manner analysis was not
appropriate.9 Ultimately, the Reno Court agreed with the district
court's statement that "the content on the Internet is as diverse as
human thought."98 The Court stated, therefore, that previous
decisions involving other media "provide no basis for qualifying the
level of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this
medium."
99
Despite the arguments from both sides addressing Fifth
Amendment vagueness and overbreadth concerns, the Supreme Court
based its entire decision on the First Amendment, stating that Fifth
Amendment principles could be addressed, instead, under a First
Amendment analysis.1°° First, the Court noted that the disputed
provisions of the CDA contain different, undefined terms: "patently
offensive" and "indecent."'' 1 According to the Court, the absence of
definitions and the use of different terms "will provoke uncertainty
among speakers about how the two standards relate to each other and
just what they mean."' 02 The Court stated that the effect of such a
content-based restriction with vague terms and potential criminal
liability would be to chill speech that is constitutionally-protected
under the First Amendment. 0 3 In addition, the Court noted that
"[t]his uncertainty undermines the likelihood that the CDA has been
carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting minors from
potentially harmful materials."'1°4
96. See 117S. Ct. at 2342.
97. See id.
98. Id. at 2344 (quoting 929 F. Supp. at 842).
99. Id.
100. See id. at 2341, 2344.
101. Id. at2344.
102. Id. (citations omitted).
103. See id.
104. Id. Finally, the Supreme Court rejected the governments arguments under the
"obscenity" standard of Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), which requires answers to
three essential questions: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community
standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." 117 S. Ct. at 2345 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at
24) (citations omitted).
The government defended the CDA by arguing that the definition of "patently offensive"
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A large part of the Supreme Court's analysis in Reno concentrated
on whether the CDA was narrowly-tailored to meet its interests in
protecting minors while respecting the constitutional rights of
adults.' O5 The Court found that the CDA's denial of minors' access to
potentially harmful speech unconstitutionally suppressed a large
amount of speech that adults have the right to receive. 10 6 Specifically,
the Court stated that a "burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less
restrictive alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve."
107
The Court devoted much of its opinion to discussing available
technology in cyberspace and how such technology relates to
enforcement of the statute, protection of the constitutional rights of
adults, and the existence of less restrictive alternatives that meet the
government's interests. 10 8 Reviewing several facts presented by the
district court, the Court first stated that there was no technology that
would effectively prevent a minor from receiving potentially harmful
materials without also preventing access by adults. 0 9 Second, the
Court noted that the district court also found no effective means to
verify age over electronic mail, newsgroups, and chat rooms." °
Finally, the Supreme Court noted that while such age verification
technology may exist on the World Wide Web through credit cards
and adult passwords, the technology is prohibitively expensive for
non-commercial providers.' 11
Notably, the Court distinguished between provider-based
comes from the second prong of the Miller test. See Appellant's Brief, Reno, 1997 WL 3293 1,
at *42. The Court rejected this assertion and noted the omission in the CDA of a critical phrase
from Miller. the requirement that the proscribed material be "specifically defined by the
applicable state law." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2345. The requirement that the restricted material be
defined by state law reduces the vagueness inherent in the term "patently offensive."
Furthermore, according to the Court, just because a three-prong test is not unconstitutionally
vague does not mean that one of those prongs, standing separately, will be constitutional. See
id.
105. See 117 S. Ct. at 2346-48.
106. See id. at 2346.
107. Id. at2346.
108. See id. at 2347.
109. See id.
110. Seeid.
11l. See id. The Court noted that it would cost as much as $10,000 for a non-commercial
provider to accommodate adult users. See id. at 2348.
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technology, designed to prevent communication of indecent material
to minors, and user-based technology (software), designed to prevent
minors' access to such material.'12 The government argued that while
the above facts demonstrate the inability to screen for age in certain
parts of cyberspace, additional facts demonstrated such control was
better handled by the government than by parental control
software.'1 3 In response, the Court held: "'Despite its limitations,
currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably
effective method by which parents can prevent their children from
accessing sexually explicit and other material which parents may
believe is inappropriate for their children will soon be available.""'1
14
This distinction is interesting in that presently undeveloped or
expensive provider-based technology for e-mail, newsgroups, chat
rooms, and the Web was not enough to save the CDA; but presently
unavailable user-based software was enough to strike it down."
t5
Critics of the Reno decision could defensibly argue that the
constitutionality of a statute should not depend upon unproven or
unavailable technology. If computer scientists do not Yet know of
certain technology, how are members of Congress expected to know
of such technology? 1 6 According to the Court, the government failed
112. Seeid.at2347.
113. In its brief to the Supreme Court, the government argued that commercial blocking
software available for consumer purchase was not as effective as the CDA in meeting the
government's interests. The governments argument was that, first, parents and schools should
not have had the sole financial responsibility of blocking inappropriate material for children-
the providers should have had to bear some of the costs. Next, the government argued that
commercial software could not keep up with the new Web sites constantly entering the Internet.
Finally, the government argued that there was no particular guarantee that all the indecent
material would be caught and blocked anyway. See Appellant's Brief, Reno, 1997 WL 32931,
at *23.
114. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347 (quoting 929 F. Supp. at 842) (emphasis added).
115. Seeid
116. A brief exchange between Bruce J. Ennis, the lead attorney for the appellees, and
Justice Scalia demonstrates the confusion concerning the fiuture constitutionality of legislation
designed to protect minors from questionable materials on the Internet:
JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Ennis, ... I throw away my computer every 5 years. I think
most people do .... Is it possible that this statute is unconstitutional today, or was
unconstitutional 2 years ago when it was examined on the basis of a record done about
2 years ago, but will be constitutional next week? ... Or next year or in two years?
MR. ENNIS: Not as it is presently worded, Justice Scalia. Because the way it's worded
now, it makes it a crime for a speaker to make available on the Internet speech that
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to meet its burden of demonstrating an absence of less restrictive
alternatives.1 7 As a result, the Court held that the CDA was not
tailored enough to meet the government's interests of protecting
children and protecting the constitutional rights of adults. 8
2. The Dissenting Opinion
In a separate opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, concurred in part and dissented in part.1 9 Justice
O'Connor admired the soundness of the purpose of the CDA, but
agreed with the majority that the constitutionality of the CDA must
be judged against the state of the Internet today, not at some point in
its future.1 20 Justice O'Connor also agreed with the majority that the
"display" provision was unconstitutional.' 2' O'Connor noted that
until gateway technology is available throughout cyberspace, a
speaker cannot be reasonably assured that the speech he displays will
would be-to display speech that would be available to a minor.
Oral Arguments for Appellees, Reno v. ACLU, 117 S. Ct. 2329 (1997) (No. 96-511), available
in 1997 WL 136253, at *48-49.
117. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at2348.
118. See id. The Court also rejected several other arguments presented by the government.
First, because the CDA criminalized speech based on its content, a time, place, and manner
analysis was not appropriate. See id. Second, the requirement that the speaker have the
"knowledge" that a minor is "listening" or accessing restricted material did not save the statute
because, given the number of Internet users at any one time, it is almost a given that at least one
of them is a child. See id. at 2349. Furthermore, most Internet fora are open to all comers,
regardless of age. See id. Finally, the Court dismissed the argument that the statute's affirmative
defenses provided enough protection for Internet speakers. See id. In response to the good faith
defense, the Court emphasized the lack of technology currently available to ensure that
"tagging" indecent material would effectively prevent children from accessing prohibited sites.
See id. Similarly, the Court held that current technology limits the effectiveness of the age
verification defense: "the District Court correctly refused to rely on unproven future technology
to save the statute." Id. at 2350. This statement is interesting, considering that the Court relied
on future technology-parental control software that will "soon" be widely available-to
invalidate the statute.
119. See Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2351-57 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
120. See id. at 2354.
121. See id. Contrary to the majority, O'Connor argued that the disputed provisions of the
CDA can and should be divided into three provisions-the "transmission" provision (section
223(aX)), the "specific person" provision (section 223(d)(1)(A)), and the "display" provision
(section 223(d)(1)(B)). This separation matches that used by the district court. See 117 S. Ct. at
2354.
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reach only adults, 122 because it is impossible to confine speech to an
"adult zone." Thus, the only way for a speaker to avoid liability under
the CDA is to refrain completely from indecent speech.
2 3
Justice O'Connor parted from the majority in her discussion of the
other two provisions of the statute. According to her dissent, while
the "display" provision was facially unconstitutional, both the
"specific person" and "transmission" provisions were not invalid in
all applications. 124 Justice O'Connor would have imposed a
knowledge requirement, holding the Internet speaker or provider
responsible for knowing that the receivers were under eighteen years
of age. 25 O'Connor stated that construing these provisions to require
the transmitter to know the age of the receiver would have validated
the CDA, as it applies to Internet communications involving one
adult and one or more minors. 126 O'Connor stated that "in this
context, these provisions are no different from the law we sustained
in Ginsberg.'2 7 However, O'Connor noted that the analogy to
Ginsberg collapsed when more than one adult was involved in the
conversation. 128 In such an application, the CDA effectively chilled
the protected speech of adults. Ultimately, Justice O'Connor stated:
Because the rights of adults are infringed only by the "display"
provision and by the "indecency transmission" and "specific
person" provisions as applied to communications involving
more than one adult, I would invalidate the CDA only to that
extent. Insofar as the "indecency transmission" and "specific
person" provisions prohibit the use of indecent speech in
communications between an adult and one or more minors,
122. See 117 S. Ct. at2354.
123. See id.
124. See id. at 2354-55.
125. See id. at 2354. The "specific person" provision did not require "knowledge"
precisely, as the transmission provision did, but it proscribed the same conduct. The
government argued, and Justice O'Connor agreed, that a knowledge requirement should have
been read into this part of the CDA. See id.
126. See id. at 2355. Such communications may occur over electronic mail or in chat
rooms. See id.
127. Id. Because O'Connor determined that the CDA is constitutional in some applications,




however, they can and should be sustained. 129
C. Reno v. ACLU and Acceptable Use Policies
As noted, many provisions of the Communications Decency
Act coincide with rules and regulations in the acceptable use policies
of schools. Consider the following hypotheticals, all based upon
existing policies around the country:
(1) No student shall use a school-owned, monitored, or
accessed telecommunications device to knowingly make,
create, or solicit and initiate the transmission of any comment,
request, suggestion, proposal, image, or other communication
which is obscene or indecent;
(2) No student shall knowingly use a school-owned,
monitored, or accessed interactive computer service to send to
a specific person or persons any material that, in context,
depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured
by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory
activities or organs.
(3) No student shall knowingly use a school-owned,
monitored, or accessed interactive computer service to display
in a manner available to another person or persons any material
that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards,
sexual or excretory activities or organs.
Violators of any of the above provisions are subject to
punishment, commensurate with the severity of the infraction,
including suspension of computer privileges and expulsion from
school.
On the basis of the decision in Reno v. ACLU, these school-based
provisions are presumptively facially unconstitutional. However, this
Article argues that just because "it can hardly be argued that ...
students ... shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
129. Id.
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expression at the schoolhouse gate[,]' 130 a decision striking down the
congressionally enacted CDA should not have consequences for
similar policies created by public school districts. The Supreme
Court's decision in Reno does not render a school district's
acceptable use policies lifeless. Instead, such policies are supported
by the rich and extensive First and Fourteenth Amendment case law
granting public schools control over their student body. Relying on
the judicial and statutory law discussed in the next section, the
constitutionality of acceptable use policies in schools stands on
relatively firm ground, despite the outcome in Reno v. ACLU.
VI. CHALLENGES TO SCHOOL-BASED CONTROL OVER THE
ELECTRONIC MEDIA
A. Discipline and Fourteenth Amendment Concerns: Vagueness and
Overbreadth
There are very few published legal critiques of acceptable use
policies.13 1 However, those that do criticize the attempts of school
administrators to control and monitor students' use of the Internet
typically challenge the policies, in part, on vagueness and
overbreadth grounds.
32
In most jurisdictions, education officials have statutory authority
to adopt rules and regulations necessary for the governance of
schools and the discipline of pupils. 33 This authority, however, is not
unlimited; rules and regulations must still be reasonably clear and
narrow. 134 In Soglin v. Kauffman,'35 for example, university students
were expelled for protesting and blocking access of a chemical
company recruiter. 36 The university charged the students under a rule
130. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist, 393 U.S. 503,506 (1969).
131. But see, e.g., Nancy Willard, A Legal and Educational Analysis of K-12 Internet
Acceptable Use Policies (visited May 9, 1998) <http:Ilwww.erehwon.com/kl2aup
/iegal analysis.html>.
132. See, e.g., Dave Kinnaman, Critiquing Acceptable Use Policies (visited May 9, 1998)
<http://www.io.com/-kinnaman/aupessay.html>.
133. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.20 (Vest 1997).
134. See Soglin v. Kauffman, 418 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1969).
135. Id.
136. See id. at 165.
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broadly prohibiting "misconduct" and argued in court that it had
"inherent power to discipline" that need not be exercised through
specific rules.' The court held that the vagueness principle was
effectively argued by the students because school officials "did not
base [student punishment] on student disregard of university
standards of conduct expressed in reasonably clear and narrow
rules."'
138
At the public school level, the Ohio Court of Appeals recently
held that disciplinary rules must be written with greater specificity.
139
Under an Ohio statute, boards of education are required to adopt
policies that specify the type of misconduct for which a pupil may be
suspended.140 In Wilson v. South Central Local School District, a
student who was suspended for possession of tobacco complained
successfully that his school's discipline policy was not specific
enough to cover the alleged infraction. 141 The decision in Wilson may
inform education officials that with the Internet and consistently new
developments in computer technology, schools likely will be
concerned about new offenses not formally specified in discipline
policies.
At least one court has held that the "school has inherent authority
to maintain order and to discipline students."'142 In Esteban v. Central
Missouri State College,143 students took part in a demonstration that
caused damage to college property. 44 Two of the suspended students
contested their punishment and challenged the school rule prohibiting
"participation in mass gatherings which might be considered unruly
or unlawful."' 4 5 The students complained that the rule was vague and
overbroad. 14 6 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit held that universities have inherent authority to maintain
137. See id.
138. Id. at 167.
139. See Wilson v. South Cent. Local Sch. Dist., 669 N.E.2d 277 (Ohio C. App. 1995).
140. See OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3313.661(A) (West 1997).
141. See Wilson, 669 N.E.2d at 278, 280.
142. Esteban v. Central Mo. State College, 415 F.2d 1077, 1088 (8th Cir. 1969).
143. Id.
144. Seeid. at 1079.
145. Id. at 1081.
146. See id. at 1083.
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order and discipline.1 47 The court stated that university conduct rules
do not need to be drawn with the same specificity as criminal
codes. 48 The court held that there is no constitutional infraction when
university rules are created with flexibility and reasonable breadth;
university punishment is part of the educational process and, as such,
may be expressed in general terms.
149
The terms of school rules may also withstand vagueness claims if
they are generally understood by the target audience. In Wiemerslage
v. Maine Township High School District 207,150 high school
administrators suspended students for loitering in an "off-limits area"
immediately adjacent to the school.15 1 The students alleged that the
school's anti-loitering rule was void for vagueness. 5 2 The court
disagreed and held that the simple dictionary definition of "loitering"
was sufficiently clear to warn people of common intelligence of the
prohibited conduct.1
53
The "overbreadth" doctrine relates to legislation or school rules
that may be too sweeping in coverage. The doctrine proscribes overly
broad polices that may have a deterrent or "chilling" effect on
protected First Amendment expression. Under an allegation of
overbreadth, schools must demonstrate that policies restricting
student free speech rights further a compelling state interest and are
no greater than necessary to further that interest. This means that the
school policy must be narrowly aimed at meeting school objectives
so as not to reach expressive conduct that would otherwise be
constitutionally protected.
The United States Supreme Court recognized schools' strong
interest in maintaining order in Grayned v. City ofRockford.5 4 In that
case, a student was convicted of violating a local anti-picketing
ordinance that prohibited such activity within 150 feet of a public
147. See id. at 1084-85.
148. See id. at 1088-89.
149. See id. at 1089.
150. 29 F.3d 1149 (7th Cir. 1994).
151. See id. at 1150.
152. See id. at 1150-51.
153. Seeid. at 1152.
154. 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
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school. 155 The student, along with others, marched on a sidewalk,
which was less than 100 feet from the school, carrying a placard that
was visible from inside classrooms. 156 He challenged the city
ordinance, arguing that it sought to regulate constitutionally protected
activity and was overbroad and vague. 157 His conviction was upheld
by the Court on the grounds that school officials have a legitimate
government interest in preventing activity that materially disrupts
classwork and involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights
of others. 158 The Court found no overbreadth as the ordinance was
narrowly tailored to the school's compelling interest in having an
uninterrupted school session conducive to student learning.
59
Generally, public education authorities must create rules to
maintain order and discipline and the rules must provide specific
standards to guide student conduct.' 60 Vague or overbroad rules may
give school administrators too much discretion when disciplining
students, and this may cause discrimination against some students.' 6 '
However, courts considering issues of vagueness and overbreadth of
school policies have determined that school disciplinary regulations
do not have to be developed with as much specificity as other
governmental regulations, and are best left to the discretion of school
personnel. In this respect, the Fifth Circuit has noted:
Some degree of discretion must, of necessity, be left to ...
school officials to determine what forms of misbehavior should
be sanctioned. Absent evidence that the broad wording [of
school rules] is, in fact, being used to infringe on
[constitutional] rights ... we must assume that school officials
are acting responsibly in applying the broad statutory
155. See id. at 106.
156. See id. at 105.
157. See id. at 108.
158. See id. at 118-21.
159. Seeid. at 118.
160. See Soglin, 418 F.2d at 167.
161. See, e.g., Sherpell v. Humnoke Sch. Dist. No. 5, 619 F. Supp. 670 (E.D. Ark.
1985)(finding that the combination of vagueness and discretion meant that African-American
students were being disciplined for behavior for which white students were not being
disciplined).
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62
B. Acceptable Use and the First Amendment
No recorded court decision to date has directly addressed the issue
of student First Amendment rights and access to the Internet by
public school students. However, courts have confronted similar
issues regarding obscenity and pornography, symbolic speech, lewd
expression, the public forum doctrine, and whether a student has a
constitutional right to receive information. 63 From these cases, we
may extrapolate that the control which school personnel have over
the use of the electronic media in schools may depend on the kind of
access given to students and the purposes of such access.
1. Obscenity
In general, the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech
or material; such speech is "utterly without redeeming social
importance."'1 The standard for determining whether material is
obscene was clarified by the United States Supreme Court in Miller v.
California.165 Under the Miller standard, obscenity is speech that the
average person applying contemporary community standards would
find to: (1) appeal to a prurient interest in sex; (2) depict or describe,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
applicable state law; and (3) lack serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.1
66
States may maintain different standards of obscenity for children
and adults and, thus, prohibit the distribution to children of material
that is acceptable for adults. The United States Supreme Court in
Ginsberg v. New York 167 upheld a state statute prohibiting the sale of
162. Jenkins v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 506 F.2d 992, 1004 (5th Cir. 1975) (quoting
Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 472 F.2d 438,442 (5th Cir. 1973)).
163. See, e.g., Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist.
No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); Board ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982); Tinker v.
Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
164. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957).
165. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
166. Seeid. at24.
167. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
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sexually explicit magazines to school-aged children. 6 The materials
were deemed not to be obscene for adults and, in fact, were freely
sold to that population.'6 9 The Court held, however, that the materials
could not be sold to children under seventeen years old where states
have legislated a standard of obscenity for those below the age of
majority, even if that standard is different for adults.1 ° The Court
declared that it was not an invasion of the free expression rights of
children to adjust the definition of obscenity "to social realities by
permitting the appeal of this type of material to be assessed in terms
of the sexual interests ... of such minors."'17 The case acknowledged
that free expression rights of children are evaluated on a standard that
varies based on the age and maturity of the child. This "variable
obscenity" standard gives the state great power to regulate the
children's access to obscene materials based on the state's power to
promote the societal value of morality.
172
On the information highway, the definition of obscenity and the
legal standards that emanate from it apply to students' creation of
obscene materials and the distribution of obscene materials to
students. In both cases, boards of education may successfully assert
interests in promoting social morality and responsibility and civility
in social discourse. Schools may prohibit the use of school computers
for the transmission or receipt of obscene, vulgar, or indecent
expression.
2. School Disruption
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District173 is perhaps
the most fundamental and universal of the school free speech cases.
In Tinker, the school disciplined several students for wearing black
168. See id. at 645.
169. See id. at 634.
170. See id. at 636-37.
171. Id. at 638 (quoting Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502,509 (1966).
172. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978). In Bethel the Court reiterated its position regarding obscenity
and school children by holding that school personnel have the authority to regulate vulgar,
indecent, or offensive speech that occurs on school grounds in light of the special characteristics
of the school environment. See 478 U.S. at 686-87.
173. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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armbands to protest the Vietnam War. 74 The United States Supreme
Court held that such silent, passive speech neither violated the rights
of other students and staff nor disrupted the smooth operation of the
school. 75 The decision established the fact that public school students
have constitutional rights, including those of expression. 176 The Court
recognized that these rights are less pronounced than those of citizens
outside of school, but found that they could not be curtailed by school
officials except when such expression materially or substantially
disrupted the smooth functioning of the school or interfered with
other students' rights.177 According to the decision, the burden for
demonstrating "substantial interference" falls on school officials.
78
Therefore, school personnel are required to make a strong evidentiary
showing before abridging student free expression rights.'7
For a modem, technological example of Tinker, consider silent,
passive, anti-war messages or pictures sent by a student to other
students via e-mail or the Intemet. Under the Tinker rule, silent
expression is not necessarily free from disruption. If these e-mail
messages materially and substantially interfere with the operation of
the school, then the school may restrict such communication without
an unconstitutional deprivation of the student's rights.
3. Inappropriate Expression
Likely the most talked-about link between young people and
electronic communication involves lewd, indecent, and sexually
oriented speech. The United States Supreme Court already permits
school officials to control such expression-especially when the
target audience includes younger children. In Bethel School District
No. 403 v. Fraser,80 the Court upheld a school's decision to suspend
a student for delivering a lewd, indecent, and vulgar campaign speech
174. See id. at 504.
175. See id. at 508.




180. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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at a student assembly.' 8 ' The Court distinguished the speech of the
student in this case from the passive demonstration at issue in
Tinker. 182 Specifically, the Court found that inappropriate expression
by a student implicated school officials' authority to determine
socially appropriate behavior. 83 In upholding the disciplinary action
against the student, the Court observed that the rights of children in
public school are different from those enjoyed by adults in public
discussion. 184 The Court fixed no specific standard for deciding what
kind of speech in school was appropriate. Rather, a clear majority
held that schools may define the kinds of expression by students that
are consistent with their own pedagogical objectives.
1 85
Based on Bethel, it is plausible to assume that lewd, offensive,
indecent, or vulgar material accessed, created, and sent by school
students to other students over the information highway may be
restricted by school officials. As the Bethel Court recognized, schools
must be permitted to educate students for citizenship and instill
fundamental societal values, 8 6 and "[t]he determination of what
manner of speech in the classroom or in the school assembly is
inappropriate properly rests with the school board."'
187
Schools are not restricted to the Tinker and Bethel standards in
prohibiting inappropriate speech. Federal law prohibits speech that
threatens the physical safety of another person if transmitted in
interstate or foreign commerce. 88 Such a statute was interpreted in
the highly publicized case of United States v. Baker. 89 In Baker, a
University of Michigan student (Jake Baker) was charged with
communicating threats to injure and kidnap women, young girls, and
a female classmate specifically named and described in e-mail
181. Seeid. at 685.
182. See id.
183. See id. at 685-86.
184. See id. at 682-83.
185. See id. at 685-86.
186. Seeid. at 681.
187. Id. at 683.
188. "Whoever transmits in interstate or foreign commerce any communication containing
any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of another, shall be fined
under this title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994).
189. 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995), aff'd, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
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messages sent to another Internet user in Canada.' 90 Earlier, Baker
had written and posted to a publicly accessible Internet newsgroup a
story that graphically described the torture, rape, and murder of a
woman given the name of one of Baker's classmates.' 9' Ultimately,
the government abandoned this newsgroup story as a basis of
prosecution because it did not constitute a threat. 92 The district court,
therefore, addressed only those charges involving private e-mail
messages sent by Baker to other Internet users.
193
In his motion to quash the indictment, Baker argued that the
application of the law to his e-mail transmissions violated the First
Amendment. 94 The court held that the e-mail communications from
Baker were not true threats and, therefore, dismissed the indictment
against Baker. 95 The court noted that Baker's language appeared in
private, inaccessible e-mail messages sent only to one other person.
196
While each of the e-mail letters cited in the charges graphically
discussed and depicted sexual violence against women, the court
determined that the letters failed to identify any specific threatened
action or to limit the targets of his discussions to a specific person or
class of persons.
197
Baker was decided in a university setting and may have limited
applicability in primary and secondary education settings. Under the
Bethel analysis, schools probably have a broader range of restrictions
over the speech of students than the government does over
individuals like Baker. Schools have the obligation to prepare
students for positive public discourse and compliance with
fundamental societal values. That is, while the government may not
be able to prosecute an individual for certain inappropriate speech he
or she sends to other individuals by electronic media, school officials
might be able to punish students for the same communication sent to
other students or other persons over school computers.
190. See Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1378-79.
191. See id. at 1379.
192. See id. at 1379-80.
193. Seeid.at 1380.
194. See id.
195. See id. at 1381-90.
196. See id.at 1390.
197. See id. at 1385-86.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol54/iss1/9
CYBERSPACE AND SCHOOLS
4. Legitimate Pedagogical Concerns
Student expression may be curtailed based on the authority of a
school over curricular issues and a school's obligation to maintain a
safe and orderly environment. A school's authority to regulate
student rights may depend on the type of expression, whether the
expression falls under the aegis of the school, and whether the
expression has a negative impact upon the school's image or
interferes with the rights of other students.
School districts have broad control over the content of curriculum,
in effect giving them power tantamount to the exercise of prior
restraint.198 In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,199 a principal
prohibited the publication of two pages of a school-sponsored
newspaper that contained articles on teen pregnancy and divorce.2°
Because the identity of persons implicated may have been obvious
from the stories, the principal believed the articles to be inappropriate
for the paper.20' In considering the ensuing First Amendment
challenge, the Supreme Court held in favor of the school.20 2 The
Court held that the school newspaper and its associated journalism
course were sponsored by the school and, therefore, subject to the
rules, regulations, and administrative decisions of school officials.
203
The Court reasoned that the school had not established the newspaper
as a public forum and, therefore, school officials could censor student
expression if "their actions are reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns.' 2°4 Furthermore, the Court noted that the
school-sponsored speech of students could be viewed by the public as
198. The term "prior restraint" is defined as:
Any scheme that gives public officials the power to deny use of a forum for expression
in advance of the actual expression. In constitutional law, the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution prohibits the imposition of a restraint on a constitutionally
protected publication before it is published.
D. SPERRY, P.T.K. DANIEL, ET AL., EDUCATION LAW AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: A
COMPENDIUM 1136-37 (2d ed. 1998).
199, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
200. See id. at 263-64.
201. Seeid. at263.
202. See id. at 266.
203. See id. at 268-69.
204. Id. at 272-73.
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bearing the endorsement, or imprimatur, of the school.205 Under
Hazelwood, schools have control over the speech of students when
the speech is faculty supervised, or when it involves the educational
mission of the school.20
6
The Hazelwood decision is applicable to student use of the
Internet in public schools. If student speech via computers is
facilitated as part of a school's curriculum, then it is school-
sponsored. Because Internet access in schools is provided primarily
for educational purposes, school sponsorship of Internet speech is
nearly a given. Furthermore, a school's Internet system will likely be
considered a limited public forum, similar to the newspaper in
Hazelwood. As a result, any speech generated over such a school's
electronic media could easily be attributed to the school.
If such speech is not a specific part of a school's curriculum, but
is communicated over the school's computer facilities or on school
time, then it may bear the imprimatur of the school. A simple
example of Hazelwood's application to the Internet is a school
newspaper created on computer and "delivered" by e-mail. Another
example may be a message sent by a student with an e-mail address
linked to the school to someone outside the school who may believe
the message to be supported by school leaders. Under Hazelwood,
school districts are likely to have control over all such expression.
C. Restrictions on School Authority
1. Viewpoint Discrimination
The reach of Hazelwood and Bethel is not absolute. Recent
decisions have held that some viewpoint discrimination by school
officials may be prohibited, thus tempering the school's control over
student expression. For example, a unanimous United States Supreme
Court in Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School
District° upheld the right of a religious congregation to use public
205. See id.
206. See id. at 273.
207. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
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school facilities for a film series after school hours.2 °8 The film series
was based on fundamentalist Christian views about how families in
America are being undermined by media influences.20 9 Ultimately,
the Court ruled that because school access was extended to non- or
quasi-religious groups representing similar viewpoints, permission
also had to be granted to Lamb's Chapel.210 The Court found that the
school had created a limited public forum in permitting its facilities
to be used for community events.2n Moreover, while the subject of
family values was not prohibited, the school prevented only religious
organizations from delivering the message.212 The Court found that
school officials violate the First Amendment "when [they deny]
access to [religious groups] solely to suppress the point of view [they
espouse] ... on an otherwise includable subject.
213
The Supreme Court rendered a similar decision relating to higher
education. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of
Virginia,214 the University of Virginia denied school funding to one
of several student publications solely on the basis of the publication's
religious philosophy.215 The University sought to justify its decision
on Establishment Clause principles and on limited availability of
funds.216 The Supreme Court concluded that the University engaged
in unlawful viewpoint discrimination.217 Following Lamb's Chapel
and Rosenberger, it may be concluded that school officials cannot
engage in viewpoint discrimination in promulgating or carrying out
rules and regulations surrounding the use of electronic media
equipment. This may be true not only for curricular issues, but
extracurricular activities as well, given the facts of these two cases.
218
208. See id. at 397.
209. See id. at 388.
210. Seeid. at395.
211. See id. at 392-93.
212. See id. at 394-95.
213. Id. at 394 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S.
788, 806 (1985)).
214. 515U.S.819(1995).
215. See id. at 822-23.
216. Seeid. at 827.
217. See id. at 845-46.
218. The Hazelwood Court made it clear that it was not addressing extracurricular issues.
However, it appears that schools can exercise prior restraint over student expression if the
extracurricular activity could be viewed as carrying the schools "imprimatur." But see Romano
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To apply the above cases to a situation involving the Internet in
public schools, consider an example in which students send e-mail
messages or post bulletins on the Web advertising student club
activities. Under Lamb's Chapel and Rosenberger, if messages from
some clubs are allowed, then messages from all clubs should be
allowed. This may be the case, whether the notices are posted and
supported by student members of the club (similar to Lamb's Chapel)
or by the school as a whole, perhaps by a school home page (similar
to Rosenberger).
2. State Law
School board authority to control the expression of students may
also be moderated by state law. California, the state enacting the first
statutory scheme for protecting student free expression rights on
school campuses, has determined that the broad power to censor
expression in school-sponsored publications for pedagogical purposes
recognized in Kuhlmeier is not available to state educators. In Lopez
v. Tulare Joint Union High School District,219 high school students
brought an action challenging the school board's authority to censor
the script of a student-produced film. 220 The script addressed the
problems of teenage pregnancy and contained profane language that
school officials found highly offensive and educationally
unsuitable.221 The state appeals court upheld the school board's
decision to delete the profanity from the script,222 but stated that the
board's power in this area is limited because editorial control of
official student publications (as well as scripts) rests with the students
alone.223 The court noted that the state legislature intended only to
restrict student expression when it fell below "professional standards
of English," and there could be no prior restraint by school officials
v. Harrington, 725 F. Supp. 687 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). In Romano, a federal district court interpreted
Hazelwood narrowly and held that school officials may not exercise editorial control over
student-based extracurricular publications.
219. 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
220. See id. at 764.
221. Seeid.
222. See id.
223. See id. at 775.
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except insofar as this provision was violated.224 In concluding that the
decision did not violate California's constitutional prohibition against
prior restraint, the court stated, "[t]he Board has not censored the
students' expression of ideas; rather the Board has prohibited their
expression of those ideas by the use of profane language. 225
The Massachusetts supreme court has decided, under a Tinker
analysis, that public high school students have the freedom to engage
in speech that might be considered vulgar, but that does not cause
disruption or disorder in school. In Pyle v. School Committee,226 two
students claimed that a school dress code policy prohibiting "clothing
that was obscene, profane, lewd, or vulgar" violated their First
Amendment right to free expression.227 The court found that a state
statute governing this issue required school officials to demonstrate
that student expression was disruptive in order to be prohibited:
The right of students to freedom of expression in the public
schools of the commonwealth shall not be abridged, provided
that such right shall not cause any disruption or disorder within
the school. Freedom of expression shall include without
limitation, the rights and responsibilities of students,
collectively and individually, (a) to express their views through
speech and symbols, (b) to write, publish and disseminate their
views, (c) to assemble peaceably on school property for the
purpose of expressing their opinions.228
The court declined to accept the school district's argument that
Bethel or Hazelwood narrowed the holding in Tinker, thus granting
broader authority to administrators in regulating student
expression. 229 According to the court, the state legislature had ample
opportunity over the years to change the statute to reflect new
224. See id. at 777.
225. Id. at 778. Other states have followed California's example by enacting statutes
protecting students' right of free expression, limited only by issues of obscenity, defamatory
expression or expression that creates a clear and present danger of the commission of unlawful
acts. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 22-1-120 (1997); IOWA CODE ANN. § 280.22 (West 1996).
226. 667 N.E.2d 869 (Mass. 1996).
227. Id. at 871.
228. Id. (quoting Mass Gen. Laws ch. 71, § 82 (1994)).
229. See id. at 872.
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trends.230 Moreover, since the legislation was not ambiguous, the
court saw no need for ajudicial reinterpretation.2 3'
Lopez and Pyle notwithstanding, many states follow the decision
in either Bethel or Hazelwood in making decisions about student
expression in schools. Ohio, for example, has determined that schools
must be able to set high standards and, following the decision in
Hazelwood, need not support any student expression that does not
"reasonably" relate to legitimate pedagogical concerns. The state also
has announced that public schools are not traditional public fora
when there is no intent to create any sort of forum under school aegis
that fosters unfettered expressive activity.232  According to
Hazelwood, a public forum is one where school authorities have "'by
policy or practice' opened [school] facilities for 'indiscriminate use
by the general public."'233 The Court in Hazelwood thus adopted a
"reasonableness" standard, or the most minimal of judicial scrutiny,
when examining constitutional issues.
The California and Massachusetts decisions, however, cannot be
overlooked because they provide restrictions on the power of school
authorities set by either the state judiciary or legislature. The
California courts have ruled that student expression, in the form of
school publications or student theatrical productions, falls into a
"limited forum" category.234 The "limited forum" is "property the
state has opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public. In
a limited forum, the [school district's] ability to regulate expression is
greatly reduced, but it may restrict access to the forum consistent
with the purposes for which it was created." 35 The court in Lopez
declared that the script at issue was conceptually no different than a
school yearbook or newspaper produced in a journalism class.236 In
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See, e.g., Quappe v. Endry, 772 F. Supp. (S.D. Ohio), affd, 979 F.2d 851 (6th Cir.
1991).
233. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 (quoting Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators'
Assn., 460 U.S. 37,47 (1983)).
234. See, e.g., Lopez v. Tulare Joint Union High Sch. Dist. Bd. of Trustees, 40 Cal. Rptr.
2d 762 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995).
235. Id. at 778. The court defined a "nonpublic forum" as "public property that is not a




California, such expression is deemed to occur in a limited public
forum. As such, educators must demonstrate that any regulation of
student speech advances a compelling state interest-the highest
form of judicial scrutiny.237 The Lopez court noted that in the
California educational environment, strict scrutiny or a compelling
state interest is advanced when school authorities seek to promote
"moral improvement" or teach students to refrain from using profane
language.
3 8
The Massachusetts Supreme Court in Pyle sustained the historic
reach of Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School
District239 by reiterating that student rights of free expression could
not be removed except when they substantially interfered with the
work of the school or impinged upon the rights of other students.240
This "substantial interference" or "valid state interest" standard241
was extended by the state from toleration of silent protest of the
Vietnam War (in Tinker) to toleration by school officials of student-
worn clothing that is obscene, profane, lewd, or vulgar.
School authority over the use of the Internet may face restrictions
based on the above cited case law. There may also be additional
restrictions to consider. This Article has previously noted that there is
an absence of case law governing the use of electronic media in
schools. This is important because the Supreme Court has ruled that
the First Amendment cannot be uniformly applied across the board
for all communication media; instead, the unique attributes of each
medium must be understood and accounted for.242 Hence, school
regulations that are constitutional when applied to regular student
speech in school may not be protected to the same degree when
applied to use of the Internet. Presently, there are no definitive
answers with regard to students' First Amendment protection of
speech through electronic media.
237. See id.
238. See id. at 778-79.
239. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
240. See Ple, 667 N.E.2d at 871.
241. See Tinker, 392 U.S. at 515, (White, J., concurring).
242. See Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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D. Cyberspace and the Curriculum
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that public
schools are important for setting an academic foundation for students
and for preparing students to become citizens in a democratic
society.24 3Hence, school officials have been permitted to establish
school curriculla that are designed to transmit community values and
a respect for authority. 2" States possess broad power to determine
curriculla in public schools, including the use of instructional
materials in the classroom and the selection of information for school
libraries. Courts generally give deference to these educational
decisions and interfere only if decisions by school officials are
arbitrary or impair the constitutional rights of students. 245
In Board of Education v. Pico,246 the United States Supreme Court
held that local school boards have the authority to develop a
curriculum that is consistent with community values.247 This
authority extends to decisions regarding which books to place on
school library shelves. But these decisions must be made without
inhibiting students' legitimate exercise of academic inquiry.248 The
Pico Court made a distinction between instructional materials for
classroom use and materials available in the library.249 In a plurality
opinion, the Court ultimately held that school officials may not
remove books from a school library simply because they disagree
with the ideas contained in those books.250 The Court opined that
school boards may not prescribe what is acceptable in
243. See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
244. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
245. See Pico, 457 U.S. 853; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
246. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
247. See id. at 864.
248. See id. at 866-67. The Court quoted from previous decisions concerning the First
Amendment right to receive information: "[T]he State may not, consistently with the spirit of
the First Amendment, contract the spectrum of available knowledge," id. at 866 (quoting
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965)); "[IThe Constitution protects the right to
receive information and ideas," id. at 867 (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564
(1969)); "The right of freedom of speech and press ... embraces the right to distribute
literature, and necessarily protects the right to receive it" id. at 867 (quoting Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
249. See id. at 868.
250. See id. at 869.
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constitutionally protected areas such as religion, politics, or other
matters of opinion and may not attempt to do so by censoring
materials in the school library.25'
School boards may, however, remove books from library shelves
if the book's educational suitability is in question. In Virgil v. School
Board, 252 school board members removed from the curriculum of an
elective course a translation of Lysistrata, by Aristophanes, and The
Miller's Tale, by Geoffrey Chaucer, because they deemedpassages in
the works to be sexually explicit and excessively vulgar. 3Following
students' allegation that the board members actions violated the First
Amendment, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit determined that the school board was empowered to make
curricular decisions, such as the choice of a textbook and whether it
could be used in a course.2"4 This is true whether those materials are
required for a mandatory or elective course, as such hegemony
extends over "curriculum" within its broad definition.255 The Virgil
court deemed the removal of the books to be appropriate because
school officials may take into account the emotional maturity of
student audiences when curricular decisions are made, either in the
classroom or in the school library.256
Recall that the Internet is not a tangible entity or organization. No
one owns it or manages it. With this in mind, how do Pico and Virgil
affect acceptable use policies? The other First Amendment cases
presented in this Article-for example, Bethel and Hazelwood-can
be applied to the Internet in schools without much loss of school
control. Curriculum, however, appears to be a different situation.
Before the inappropriate "books" are discovered by teachers and
school administrators, the damage is done; the students, many of
them still immature, have already "checked them out." On the
Internet, a student's library is endless, without school (and perhaps
parental) control, regardless of the social maturity of the user and the
suitability of the material. With the Internet and the World Wide
251. See id. at 869-70.
252. 862 F.2d 1517 (9th Cir. 1989).
253. See id. at 1518-19.
254. See id. at 1523-25.
255. See id.
256. See id. at 1521.
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Web, the free exercise of academic inquiry in Pico likely has been
expanded beyond the reach of acceptable use polices-and beyond
school control.
Challenges against classroom materials are waged, too, by
teachers, students, and parents. In Roberts v. Madigan,5 7 a teacher
challenged a school's request that he stop reading the Bible in his
classroom and that he remove two religious books from his classroom
library.258 Against the teacher's free speech and free exercise claims,
the court held that the school district acted properly in removing the
books from the classroom.259 The district's purpose was to promote
religious neutrality.260 The primary effect of the district's action was
to insulate students from undue exposure to the teacher's chosen
profession.z ' If the Internet has made the world into a library now,
who's to say that the world is not a classroom? Anyone with an e-
mail address and account who can send material can surely receive it.
Schools may need to be alert to personnel who use the Internet to
communicate inappropriate material.
While Roberts involved a challenge against the removal of a book
from a classroom, Grove v. Mead School District No. 35426 2 involved
a challenge against a school's refusal to remove a book from a course
syllabus. 63 In Grove, a student and a parent found the book, The
Learning Tree, by Gordon Parks, to be offensive to their religious
beliefs.26 The student was given an alternative assignment and was
permitted to leave during classroom discussion of the book, but chose
to remain. 265 The student sued the school board over its refusal to
remove the book from the course's syllabus. On appeal, the court
held that the book neither promoted a religion nor criticized a
religion.266 The court found that the goal of the book was to expose
students to the lifestyles and experiences of Black Americans, a
257. 702 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Colo. 1989), aft'd, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir. 1990).
258. See id. at 1508-09.
259. See id. at 1515.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. 753 F.2d 1528 (9th Cir. 1985).
263. Seeid. at 1531.
264. See id.
265. See id.
266. See id. at 1534.
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secular and legitimate educational purpose.267
Clearly, Pico, Virgil, Roberts, and Grove are applicable to the
Internet. A central debate surrounding Pico and similar library book
cases is a student's right to receive information. Information retrieval
is likely the main reason students use the Internet and access the
Web. The Internet and the World Wide Web are, in effect, a
worldwide library or classroom. Remember, though, that there is no
central control unit to monitor what "books" enter and exit this
library. This is an increasing concern for public schools. In traditional
school libraries, schools control which materials are placed on the
school shelves, with only some restriction. On the Internet, this
control is much more decentralized. Each user controls the materials
that enter the system, again with only some restriction. In any case, to
apply either Pico or Virgil literally, schools with computer systems in
both libraries and classrooms would have to enforce different rules
for computer use depending on where the computer is located and
who controls it. Moreover, from the case law it is likely that school
officials have the authority to determine the appropriateness of
materials for school populations whether in the classroom or the
library. That authority, however, does not extend to the regulation of
ideas or viewpoints, particularly those that are politically or
religiously based. This principle would seem to relate to the
regulation of electronic media. This presents somewhat of a dilemma
for school personnel in that issues of vulgarity and obscenity are,
arguably, subject to school acceptable use policies. There is some
question as to whether such policies control access by students to
Web sites featuring racist hate speech, abortion, Satanism, and other
controversial topics in contemporary society.268
VII. CONCLUSION
As the above discussions indicate, public schools will likely retain
control over student use of electronic media, despite the Supreme
Court's decision in Reno v. ACLU. This retention of control,
however, does not eliminate all of the concerns and responsibilities
267. See id.
268. See 142 CONG. REC. S694 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Leahy).
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educators may have. Of course, just as proponents of the
Communications Decency Act have been forced into court, school
leaders can expect acceptable use policies to come under similar legal
fire. That is, acceptable use policies may be subject to First and Fifth
(via the Fourteenth) Amendment challenges.
The appellees in Reno v. ACLU criticized the government's
reliance on cases like Pacifica and Ginsberg, stating that those cases,
unlike the CDA, did not address a complete ban on constitutionally
protected speech among adults. According to the ACLU and the other
plaintiffs, the CDA essentially requires adults to conform all of their
Internet speech, from commercial and non-commercial sources, to
speech that would be appropriate for children in the least tolerant
community in the United States. This restriction is particularly true
for newsgroups, LISTSERVs, and chat rooms, where it is not
technologically possible to screen for age. Furthering the argument
that the CDA is ineffective, the Reno appellees noted that the Act did
not reach foreign-born communications, now comprising at least
forty percent of the traffic on the Net. The appellees also argued that
the CDA was vague and overbroad. According to the appellees, there
are no consistent definitions of "indecent" and "patently offensive"
speech. As a result, the Act would have targeted constitutionally
protected expression about AIDS, rape, homosexuality, censorship,
and human rights, much of which may be useful to older minors, as
well as adults. Furthermore, the Act allegedly chilled the speech of
adults in cyberspace; out of fear of prosecution, adults would curtail
the use of their protected speech or refrain from communicating over
the Internet altogether.
Despite the Supreme Court's decision in ACLU v. Reno,
acceptable use policies can be constitutionally supported. Within its
general authority to discipline pupils, and from a long, sturdy line of
First Amendment case law, a school may restrict the expression of
students, including speech over e-mail and the Internet, that (1) is
materially or substantially disruptive to other people or to school
activities, (2) is offensively lewd, indecent, vulgar, and inappropriate
for children, and (3) is school-sponsored, or bears the imprimatur of
the school, and when the restriction is related to legitimate
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pedagogical concerns. In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,269
the Supreme Court held that random, suspicionless drug testing of
student athletes by school districts is not unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment.270 In its opinion, the Court stated more generally
that because public school students are committed to the temporary
custody of school officials, those officials may exercise a greater
degree of control and supervision over students than the degree of
control to which adults are subject outside of schools. 271 According to
the Court, school children need greater supervision than adults in
order to establish "a proper educational environment,, 272 and to
enforce reasonable, flexible, and effective rules against conduct that
is unacceptable in such a school environment.273 Naturally, in today's
global and computerized society, it is not surprising to find such
conduct while driving on the information superhighway.
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